Fully integrated space operations demand parallel processing of standardized hardware components that are delivered and integrated just in time to support mission objectives. Flight Software is also a critical component, one that must be customized for each mission, enabling the launch vehicle and payload to perform unique mission objectives. Satisfying these operational needs with a single standardized flight software component, built using current software development practices is notoriously difficult. Modern automated software production tools can now successfully eliminate one or more labor-intensive manual process steps, offering tangible and significant improvement versus traditional software development methods. This paper presents motivations for highly automated production and maintenance of flight software, to satisfy the need for mission customization and product improvement (i.e. new features), while better supporting the just in time delivery and integration goals of modern integrated space operations. Process streamlining, and resulting savings opportunities, will be extrapolated from the current Space Shuttle flight software development process.
I.Introduction
All components of a complex space exploration system must integrate smoothly, to support rigid mission timelines that are defined by customer commitments, and even by astronomical events such as planetary alignments. For a given spacecraft or launch vehicle design, many hardware components are generic enough that they can support multiple missions with widely varying objectives. Other components such as science payloads can be unique to a specific mission, but that uniqueness is ideally confined to the payload itself, which interacts with the larger vehicle only through a limited set of standard interfaces.
Space Shuttle flight software, because it is both mission-unique and pervasive in its role of vehicle and subsystem control and mission performance, is in a constant state of flux. A Space Shuttle mission, for example, has around 10,000 unique parameters that can be selected, applied and tested for each unique combination of mission, vehicle, payload and weather. Flight Software data tables are changed in response to launch date, mission orbital mechanics, celestial body positions, vehicle and payload mass, center of gravity, atmospheric density, winds aloft and communications and tracking infrastructure availability. This high degree of change (or opportunity for change) works against the goals set for complex technical products: stability, predictability, flexibility, interoperability, and most of all, high quality.
Of course, significant portions of a typical flight software product may never change after first delivery. For example, only about 500 of the 10,000 variable parameters will change between the most recently completed Space Shuttle mission (STS-114 at the time of this writing) and the next scheduled mission (STS-121). However, because of the fundamental nature of traditional human-authored software systems (specifically, complex interdependencies between components), even limited change has the potential of introducing or exposing failure modes that can impact the performance and safety of the entire system. As a result, all change activity must be managed very carefully to prevent introduction or exposure of software failure modes.
Superlative flight software product quality, encompassing a broad range of vehicles and payloads, has been achieved in the past through very strict manual control of the requirements definition, code development, integration, test, verification and configuration management processes used during software production. In fact, many of the internationally recognized standards governing software safety and quality address only the processes used to create and test the software, and not the end product. Such heavy reliance on strict, manual process control requires the direct participation of large numbers of highly skilled workers whose primary job is not the actual 1 Avionics Architect, Space Operations Development, 600 Gemini Mail Stop USH-803A American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics production of flight software, resulting in cost and schedule inefficiencies.
Previous generations of CASE (Computer Aided Software Engineering) tools attempted to abstract or automate one or more of these manual tasks, but without adequate regard for the relationship of the newly modified task to the remaining manual tasks. The large-scale benefits of these efforts were inconclusive at best. More recent process automation tools may or may not fall victim to similar limitations. For the specific fields of spacecraft and launch vehicle control, recent progress in the practical tools-based application of formal methods (mathematical proof of software correctness) also holds promise, potentially bringing fundamental change to the way software development and maintenance are conducted. This paper will forecast the potential impact of recent process automation tools, and map the characteristics of those tools onto known spacecraft software process costs and schedule factors, using the Space Shuttle software development and maintenance process as a reference baseline.
Section I of the paper is this introduction. Section II is an overview of the current Space Shuttle flight software product and process. Section III is the analysis of process automation impacts. Section IV proposes future work to validate these study results. Section V is the summary and conclusion of the paper.
II.Space Shuttle Software: Development, Maintenance and Reconfiguration Processes
• Flight Software -Overview The Space Shuttle Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) is a hybrid blend of hard real time, soft real time and non real time elements, with no hardware-based partitioning between those various elements. Though countless improvements and refinements have taken place over the operational life of the Space Shuttle fleet, the basic architecture of the avionics and flight software has not changed since the system was originally developed in the mid-1970's. Given that the current state of practical formal methods in 2006 is comprehensive only for deterministic hard real time constructs, PASS flight software still does not lend itself to being qualified or certified as a formally proven safety critical flight control system.
None of the Space Shuttle avionics software or hardware functions are formally proven or are derived via formal methods. Safe and correct operation is not ensured by formal methods and construction techniques. Rather, adequacy is demonstrated by exhaustive inspection of intermediate products and exhaustive test of the final operational product, followed by exhaustive review of the evidence (not proof) of correct operation.
Specifically, critical flight control functions are implemented in a hard real time manner, with a fixed execution schedule and the highest task priority, but those functions share a common computer and memory space with softand non-real time functions that run in a cooperative, priority based schedule environment. Potential interactions between critical and non-critical functions are extremely complex due to the nonexistent partitioning and limited storage protection mechanisms offered by the hardware and software.
The state of the art in 2006 has not advanced far enough to formally prove the inherent safety and correct functionality of an entire system as complex as the Space Shuttle Data Processing System (DPS). A fundamental redesign of both the avionics and software would be necessary in order to apply formal methods to the Space Shuttle flight software. This is not a criticism of Space Shuttle software quality. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the high level of quality possible when employing traditional methods in an environment where cost is not the primary concern.
Because of these technical limitations of the PASS design and the hardware platform it executes on, focus of this study is not the potential for improvement of the actual Space Shuttle software product. Rather, the focus is on the process that builds and maintains the software, and whether that process could benefit from modifications enabled by new tools and new techniques. The goal is to discover whether such modifications to a well-known process might yield benefits for future spacecraft and launch vehicles, either in development or operations, or both.
• Flight Software Development and Maintenance -Baseline Process Table 1 shows the process flow and the relative cost breakdown of a typical single, large feature change to Space Shuttle flight software, initiated by the addition, deletion, or change of one or a small number of related requirements. The actual workflow implements many such changes in parallel. Parallel changes can be related or unrelated, but all parallel change activity is scheduled for best resource utilization, and culminates in a new flight software release known as an Operational Increment, or OI. The production of a new OI is distinct from the missionspecific data tailoring know as Software Reconfiguration, which will be described briefly in a later section.
Because many changes are implemented in parallel, Table 1 is also descriptive of the entire OI development and maintenance process. The actual OI process takes longer than the individual change activity shown here, because the component changes do not commence or complete on the same day, but are skewed to optimize resource utilization.
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However, this process view is useful and valid for estimating potential process savings, both for individual development activities and entire OI development cycles. The same data is shown graphically in Fig. 1 below. The vertical axis represents percent cost, and the horizontal axis represents process duration in days. The process steps are shown as sequential to capture total process duration and resource utilization. In practice, overlap and iteration can occur, but that does not affect this process improvement analysis.
• Flight Software Development Testing Extensive flight software testing is performed in the Software Production Facility (SPF) and the Shuttle Avionics Integration Lab (SAIL). The SPF is a fully computerized simulation system, with physical models executing on a host computer, interacting with high fidelity execution of flight software object code on actual avionics processors. SAIL is an actual vehicle from an electrical perspective, including a full suite of avionics, electrical subsystems, and a working cockpit, and is surrounded by simulation systems running physical models that feed flight-like data to vehicle sensor interfaces. SPF and SAIL are both capable of executing simulations of entire missions, or specific segments of missions, including off-nominal events. These test facilities are used pervasively throughout the flight software maintenance and development processes.
SPF activities (cost and schedule) are captured within this study analysis, but SAIL activities fall outside this analysis, since SAIL test activity occurs after completion of the flight software development and test activities. SAIL is considered to be a vehicle. Software delivered to SAIL is considered to be released flight software. Software errors discovered in SAIL (if any) are considered to be field failures.
• Flight Software Reconfiguration Processes Space Shuttle flight software maintenance encompasses much more than just implementing new features and occasional fixes. Because space flight is complex compared to many other control problems, the process of Software Reconfiguration is implemented to prepare the generic flight software product for support of a specific mission. This reconfiguration process tailors vehicle control laws and event sequences for specific missions, both to accomplish mission objectives and to protect operational safety margins of the vehicle.
This mission specific software reconfiguration is distinct from developmental activities that incorporate new features and functions via requirements changes that result in source code changes. The reconfiguration processes 40  50  60  70  80  90  100  110  120  130  140  150  160  168   0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100  110  120  130  140  150  160  168 Flight Software Development Process Cost, Percent
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This figure represents the life cycle of a single Space Shuttle flight software requirements addition, deletion or change.
Numerous requirements changes are implemented in parallel. The resulting new software version is called an Operational Increment, or OI.
Box height represents the percent cost of the process step.
Box width represents duration of the process step, in days.
Process steps are shown as individually contiguous and sequential, to provide an accurate representation of total percent cost and total duration.
In practice, process steps can overlap to some degree, and several process steps can be iterative.
Some process steps such as Configuration Management are pervasive throughout the entire process.
Figure 1. Flight software development cycle baseline process
are not the focus of this study, but are described here for completeness. There are five broad classifications of reconfiguration processes and resulting products: 1) Vehicle Performance, most notably day-of-launch updates. These are for weather and launch delay effects on orbit attainment. These are uplinked to the flight software very close to launch and pre-verified via off-line simulations, including extensive Monte Carlo analysis. The actual flight software is not retested.
2) Unique vehicle physical parameters, including aerospace vehicle performance differences (mass, specific engine parameters) as well as installed equipment differences, such as Remote Manipulator System (installed or not), and cryogenic tank configuration. These flight software reconfigurations are accomplished via automated software object code patches applied after the software build process. Some flight software testing is performed to ensure the correct application of these patches.
3) Mission objectives, including preferred landing site, orbit operations (e.g. Space Station rendezvous, Space Station reboost), consumable mass, and center of gravity management. These flight software reconfigurations are accomplished via automated software object code patches applied after the software build process.
4) Payload accommodations, including data bus connectivity and data routing, crew display customization, fault detection and limit checking. This is one area of automated code generation pioneered by the Space Shuttle program. Code is compiled and built for use in Systems Management (SM) General Purpose Computers (GPCs). Testing is highly automated in the SPF.
5) Telemetry -automated testing of telemetry data selection products.
• Future Directions for Space Shuttle Flight Software The current Space Shuttle flight software system, with routine improvements and mission-specific customizations, will continue to support all missions for the remainder of the fleet's operational life. There is no technical or economic motivation to redesign the existing system or its support processes, because the opportunity for payback is limited by the impending retirement of the Space Shuttle fleet in 2010.
Obviously, the current Space Shuttle flight software system is adequate for controlling a complex aerospace vehicle, in terms of both safety and performance. The software development and maintenance processes are highly refined, and consistently produce high quality results. It follows that a new system based heavily on the current system should be achievable, and should be adequate for controlling a new vehicle or vehicles that are expected and required to be less complex than the Space Shuttle.
One possible approach for a future manned spacecraft, therefore, is to constrain it to be highly compatible with the Space Shuttle in terms of the onboard DPS and its computer language, other subsystems and data networks. These design constraints would then enable the new vehicle's software to be treated, in theory, as a very large but bounded reconfiguration of the Space Shuttle's software, allowing existing flight software processes and products to be applied directly, with limited redesign.
It is apparent, though, that maximum reuse of existing Space Shuttle resources requires imposing maximum constraints on the new vehicle design, which may be undesirable for a variety of reasons. Also, reuse of the current flight software products and processes guarantees that future programs will incur approximately the same cost and schedule burden for software development and maintenance as the Space Shuttle program. This is problematic for future programs that depend on operating multiple vehicle types within a constant budget.
Consideration should therefore be given to potential improvements to avionics systems, as well as the current flight software development, maintenance and reconfiguration processes, given that a new generation of vehicles provides a clear opportunity to remove restrictions inherent in the current system design, as well as a long time span for the accrual of process improvement payback.
Space Shuttle flight software serves as an excellent model for potential process improvement using modern process automation tools and techniques. It is large, complex, safety-critical, actively developed and maintained, and has a long history of high quality and successful operation. The development, maintenance and reconfiguration processes are well characterized. Therefore, this study will use the Space Shuttle flight software development & maintenance process as the reference point for evaluation of the new tools and techniques in question.
III.Process Improvements via Modern Tools & Techniques

A.Common Pitfalls in Traditional Software Development and Maintenance Processes
Manual translation steps are recognized as precarious events in the development of complex software systems. Multiple translation steps exist, between high-and low-level requirements, between low-level requirements and design, and between design and code. Coding often receives the greatest attention, because it is the step that American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics produces the customer's operational end product.
Coding is also the step where the traditional workflow encounters a difficult translation from natural language text-based requirements and design into computer language-and machine-specific code (software), often with unexpected results. Only a small percentage of these unexpected results are actual errors, or mistakes of translation. More often, they result from the imprecise nature of natural language requirements and design, resulting in a necessary but unconstrained process of assumption on the part of the programmer. Multiple unconstrained assumptions, by multiple programmers, produce at best a final product that may be difficult to maintain, and produce at worst a product in which disparate implementation features conflict with each other during operation, to the point of impeding fulfillment of one or more original requirements.
Many translation steps in the typical software development process have already been automated, with very positive results. For example, a compiler takes a human-readable software product written in a high level language such as C++ or Ada, and translates it into machine language for direct execution on the selected hardware platform. If we encountered a compiler that performed this translation ambiguously or erroneously, we would consider it to be broken, and we would fix it or replace it with one that worked correctly.
A traditional software development process, however, tolerates a significant degree of ambiguity and error in the translation process from requirements and design into code. More ambiguity can be introduced during testing, where test plans often must be tailored to accommodate design and implementation features of the final product rather than being strictly requirements-based. Additional layers of manual process complexity compensate for these translation ambiguities, in an effort to avoid errors and omissions. Each work product is variously constrained by rule (requirements and design), reviewed en mass (requirements, design, source code, test plans), or tested exhaustively (object code). These additional constraints, reviews and tests of course contribute to overall process cost and schedule. Why do we continue to tolerate these inefficiencies? The reason must be that a better alternative does not exist, has high barriers to adoption, or is not widely recognized.
We will now examine possible alternatives and estimate their potential impact on a mature, traditional software development process, using the Space Shuttle software development processes as a model.
B.Formal Methods
One potential way to improve the translation step from requirements to code is to ensure that the requirements are of very high quality, reducing or eliminating the need for interpretation and assumption on the part of the programmers. High quality requirements need to be complete, correct, concise, and consistent. A reliable way to achieve these goals is through the application of Formal Methods, which "…consist of a set of techniques and tools based on mathematical modeling and formal logic that are used to specify and verify requirements and designs for computer systems and software." 1 Application of formal methods to new human-generated requirements and software is possible, as described in Ref. 1 , but still involves an extra translation step, and typically is applicable only to high level requirements, not the coding process. Extending manually implemented formal methods to the manual coding and code review process is typically and correctly considered to be prohibitive. Manually applied formal methods add cost and time to the process steps where applied, in trade for reduced errors and improved verifiability in later steps. Semi-automated formal methods have been successfully employed to perform partial validation of key critical functions on certain unmanned spacecraft such as Cassini 2 , but even these computer-assisted formal analysis techniques are computationally limited to very small portions of practical systems.
Even the advocates of formal methods analysis techniques recommend tailoring (reducing) the use of formal methods on projects of significant complexity. This implies that the most safety-critical software functions, those that warrant application of formal methods to their requirements, MUST be robustly partitioned from less critical software functions by the underlying system, if the application of formal methods is a component of system acceptance and safety certification. Using the previous Space Shuttle software process breakdown as an example, we can infer that manual application of formal methods would add significant cost to the earlier requirements process steps, in trade for potential saving on the later test and verification process steps due to reduced errors.
Unfortunately, because a human programmer will still have authored every piece of software, every piece of software potentially contains programming errors. A mature software development process will therefore insist that the same level of review, test and verification be performed, in search of programming errors, regardless of the application of formal methods during requirements development.
This limits the savings potential of manually applied formal methods to the elimination of the coding rework required to correct requirements errors. Since coding is approximately 6 percent of the overall Space Shuttle process (see Appendix), and rework due to requirements errors is a small fraction of that, the assessment is that there are no significant savings to be realized through the application of formal methods to the requirements processes. Formal American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics methods are better thought of as insurance against critical errors that might otherwise escape detection during review and test.
• Automatic Code Generation Another way to improve the translation step from requirements to code is to eliminate the coding process entirely. Automatic code generation tools (also known as autocoders) offer to improve product quality by eliminating the opportunity for human error during the coding process.
Autocoder tools are a concept almost as old as computers themselves, but the meaning of the term shifts with each wave of technical advancement. In general, an autocoder is a tool that automatically translates a modern highlevel language into an earlier, lower-level language. The first assemblers, which translated symbolic (text) assembly language into machine code, were known as autocoders 2 . For the purposes of this paper, the term is used to refer to a class of tools that produce code in a modern high-level computer language such as C or Ada, using a more abstract system requirements or system design notation as input. Industry examples include SCADE KCG by Esterel Technologies, MATRIXx by National Instruments, and Rhapsody by I-Logix. Products of this nature advocate code production using a model-based representation of the system, as opposed to conventional text-based requirements and design.
A primary consideration for the use of an autocoder is the quality of the output, especially if the tool is offered as-is with no assurance or evidence of correct function. A mature software development process will once again insist that the same level of test and verification be performed on the output product as if a human programmer had written it, in search of potential tool-generated programming errors. The fact that the error rates of the tool will almost certainly be lower than the error rates of human programmers is of no consequence (and therefore no savings) to the overall process, because all sources of potential error must be mitigated.
Given this constraint, the Space Shuttle baseline software process cost breakdown (see Appendix), shows that a simple substitution of an automatic code generation tool for the manual software coding process step yields a 2 According to www.wikipedia.org, the name "autocoder" was given to what may have been the first compiler, written in 1952 by Alick E. Glennie. The term later became a generic reference to any assembly language to machine language translation program. 
95% Cost 155 Days
This figure represents the projected process improvement resulting from substitution of an auto coder tool for the manual coding process step.
Remaing process steps shift to fill the gap left by the automated coding process, resulting in overall process savings of 5 percent cost and 13 days duration.
Projected use of a new auto coder tool is allocated 1 percent cost and 1 day duration.
The original process steps are shown in gray for reference Figure 2 . Flight software development cycle modification 1, using a stand-alone autocoder maximum potential cost savings of only 6%. Figure 2 shows this savings potential, in terms of both cost and schedule, achievable by the substitution of a simple autocoding tool in place of the manual coding process step. One percent of total baseline cost and one day of schedule duration is reserved for the use of the autocoding tool. The graphic demonstrates the modest impact on the overall process.
The resulting savings shown in Fig. 2 (5 percent of total process cost, 13 days of total process duration) is most likely optimistic, because the input to the autocoder is necessarily something more concise than natural language requirements text, and that new precursor product must be created. Further, the source code produced by autocoders has no author, and therefore no human ownership, meaning that the subsequent manual reviews and inspections are conducted against a product that is unfamiliar to all participants.
Incorporation of a stand-alone autocoding tool is therefore not an attractive software development process improvement, because new process steps and process inefficiencies could easily offset the modest savings produced by a simple autocoder.
• Formal Requirements Notation, Requirements Modeling and Certified Automatic Code Generation Neither formal methods applied to requirements, nor autocoding in place of manual coding, offer enough clear advantages to be adopted independently. Next, we will examine synergies between the two concepts, as well as additional constraints on each concept, to see if there is some combination that yields significant process savings.
Formal methods were rejected as a process savings because the manual application of formal methods to textbased requirements is additional work, and the advantage of formal methods (reduced or eliminated requirements errors) only eliminates one class of errors. The resulting overall process is actually larger than the current process.
Autocoding was rejected as a significant process improvement because the potential savings are limited by the relatively small cost and duration of the current manual coding process step, and because an autocoder without proof of correct function is itself a potential source of error that must continue to be mitigated by all of the subsequent process steps currently in place.
Is it possible to achieve requirements quality equivalent to the manual application of formal methods, without the additional effort? Is it possible to create (or acquire) an autocoder with proven and certified correct functionality? An industry survey shows that there is a small but growing number of available tools with exactly these characteristics, so for the purposes of this process study, we will assume that the answer is yes. Specifically, SCADE Suite by Esterel Technologies offers both a formalized modeling notation environment and a certified code generator. The tool suite is currently used for aircraft and other safety critical embedded software applications, so we will assume (without proof or demonstration) that the tool domain is a good match for spacecraft software.
Requirements quality equivalent to the manual application of formal methods is available through tools that replace natural language as the primary requirements language. In place of a natural language, a domain-specific notation is substituted. The notation is designed to produce either a formally correct, concise and complete representation of the requirements, or syntactically incorrect result in response to user error. Syntax errors are exposed immediately by the tool and corrected immediately by the requirements author, resulting in requirements that are constrained to be formally correct, concise and complete. Given that the requirements are now represented in a formal, equation-like format, certain tools now permit direct behavioral modeling of the requirements, allowing early identification of requirements problems vs. waiting for testing of built software products to identify requirements problems much later in the process, at much greater cost.
A certified autocoder is one that has been built, examined and tested to the same quality, safety and security processes required of the application code. Though not specifically addressing autocoders, RTCA DO-178B/EUROCAE ED-12B, which governs safety critical software on civilian aircraft, captures and enforces this concept by stipulating that any tool capable of changing the code must be certified to the same level as the code it is used to create 3 . Process improvements resulting from the use of such tools in combination is projected, based on the following analyses of individual process steps: 1) Requirements tasks are left unchanged in terms of cost and schedule. The requirements activities (requirements analysis, scenario review, requirements inspection) are modified by the application of formalized notation and supporting tools, but no savings are being claimed at this time, in support of the full compliment of traditional requirements inspection meetings with the customer, consistent with the baseline process.
2) Design documentation and design inspection are projected to collapse to 1 percent of total baseline cost and 1 day in duration each, because the output of the requirements activities is formally correct, concise, complete, and contains adequate detail to serve as design, as a direct input to the autocoding process step. One percent, 1day placeholders are left in the process to cover any customer-mandated examination of the intermediate products.
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3) Autocoding (use of the tool) is allocated 1 percent and 1 day as before. 4) Code inspection is projected to collapse to 1 percent and 1 day because of the certified autocoder tool. Any direct code inspection is limited to confirmation that the tool was operated correctly, not to determine that the generated code is correct at the detail level.
5) Unit test and unit test inspection are projected to reduce by half (both cost and schedule), again because of the formalized requirements and certified autocoder tool. The tool chain reduces requirements errors and eliminates coding errors, resulting in significantly fewer errors detected in unit test, which in turn require fewer iterations between coding and unit test. The unit test activity becomes a demonstration that code matches requirements, confirming that the autocoder and configuration management tools were used correctly, rather than serving as an iterative debug session. Unit test inspection ensures that unit test coverage is adequate and properly executed.
The resulting savings shown in Fig. 3 (28 percent of total process cost, 42 days of total process duration) is significant, especially when considered in the context of a large, multi-year development and operations activity. Potential savings of this magnitude can contribute to the overall success of future programs that require developing and operating multiple vehicle types within a constant budget.
Incorporation of formal requirements notation and a certified autocoding tool is therefore an attractive software development process improvement.
• 
72% Cost 126 Days
The original process steps are shown in gray for reference
Remaing process steps shift to fill the gap left by the modified requirements, design and coding processes, resulting in overall process savings of 28 percent cost and 42 days duration.
Design documentation and design inspection shrink because formal requirements contain enough detail to be used as design. These process steps are each allocated 1 percent cost and 1 day duration, in support of traditional customer process requirements.
This figure represents the projected process improvement resulting from substitution of a certified auto coder tool for the manual coding process step, and adoption of formal requirements notation as the input to the auto coder.
Projected use of a new certified auto coder tool and code product inspection are each allocated 1 percent cost and 1 day duration.
Unit Test activities are reduced by half in both cost and schedule because requirements errors are reduced and coding errors are eliminated by the new tools. (Performance testing for Space Shuttle flight software is already highly automated, but is constrained by the limited availability of high fidelity hardware resources. Since performance testing takes place on real avionics systems, this process step executes in real time, minus the overhead of test setup and data collection. Improving the productivity of performance testing is beyond the scope of this study.)
This savings analysis also assumes that the certified tool chain concept is fully implemented by the project and fully adopted by the developer, the customer, and any 3 rd party regulatory agencies, resulting in elimination of redundant process steps, and further reduction of certain remaining process steps, as detailed below.
Process improvements resulting from the use of such tools in combination is projected, based on the following analyses of individual process steps: 1) Requirements Analysis and Scenario Review tasks are left unchanged in terms of cost and schedule, as before.
2) Requirements Inspection is projected to be reduced by half (both cost and schedule), because the Executable Requirements Modeler tool is a much more efficient way to examine requirements. Requirements Inspection savings credit is now being taken for the early identification of requirements problems vs. waiting for software testing to identify requirements problems.
3) Design documentation and design inspection are completely eliminated because they are redundant. The output of the requirements activities is formally correct, concise, complete, and contains adequate detail to serve as design, as a direct input to the autocoding process step. Customer and regulatory concurrence is assumed.
4) Autocoding (use of the tool) is allocated 1 percent of baseline cost and 1 day in duration as before. 5) Code inspection is eliminated because it is redundant. Correct use of the autocoder tool is confirmed by later test activities. Customer and regulatory concurrence is assumed.
6) Unit test is projected to collapse to 1 percent of baseline cost and 1 day in duration, because unit test of code (not the integrated system) can now be performed on the development workstation platform, and does not require access to the target avionics system, which is typically a constrained resource. Unit test now serves as a precursor to verification test. Target platform test objectives are accomplished in later test activities. 7) Unit test inspection is eliminated because of the reduced scope and importance of unit test, based on use of the certified tool chain. Any unit test process escapes (for example configuration management errors) will be revealed by the upcoming verification test activities. 8) Verification test and verification test inspection are projected to reduce by half (both cost and schedule), because of the verification test generator and coverage checker tools. Effective verification testing can now be accomplished by following a standardized process, rather than ad-hoc application of skill, experience and manual process control. Testing is deterministic, traceable directly to requirements, and is not influenced by design or code style.
9) Build and Configuration Management is projected to collapse to 1 percent of baseline cost and 1 day in duration, because the build process is fully automated by the autocoder tools, and commercially available configuration management tools can be easily integrated with the autocoder tools.
The resulting savings shown in Fig. 4 (61 percent of total process cost, 81 days of total process duration) is very significant. Potential savings of this magnitude may be key to the overall success of future programs that require developing and operating multiple vehicle types within a constant budget.
Simultaneous incorporation of formal requirements notation, a certified autocoder tool, automated verification test generation, and automated test coverage checking is therefore a very attractive software development process improvement.
IV.Future Work
Proposed future work on this topic includes examination of the goals and requirements of the mission specific Software Reconfiguration process, and how it relates to the development process automation described above. Two options exist: 1) constrain new flight software product to accommodate tables of computer data that are supplied independent of the automated development process, via a process similar to today's reconfiguration process, or 2) rework the reconfiguration process to use the same requirements-and model-based automation tools as are applied to the development process, to rebuild the portions of the flight software that are mission-unique.
Additional future work will acquire examples of the process automation tools examined in this study, and will exercise those tools in the modified process steps as described herein. The goal is to evaluate claims vs. actual capabilities, learning curve, tool throughput and productivity, ease of integration between tools from different vendors, and particularly the applicability of various formal requirements notations to the various software functional domains encountered in the design and operation of a complex space vehicle.
Lastly, there is a need to evaluate and reconcile potential differences between the safety, quality assurance and project control documents used for spacecraft development projects, and the predominant control documents used for commercial aviation software development projects. Commercial aircraft development represents a much larger market than spacecraft development. Market forces strongly influence the direction and progress of software development tools and techniques. The two disciplines (aircraft software and spacecraft software) are technically very similar, and many of the skills and tools are interchangeable in a technical sense. However, the two customer bases may have different expectations, based on tradition and familiarity. For example, while RTCA DO-178B/EUROCAE ED-12B 3 accepts tool certification evidence as an alternative to certain manual software product certification steps, NASA software process control documents 4, 5, 6 still state or imply that manual process steps such as code inspection and unit test are mandatory, precluding much of the cost and schedule savings predicted by this study. Projected use of a new certified auto coder tool is allocated 1 percent cost and 1 day duration.
Design documentation and design inspection are eliminated because formal requirements contain enough detail to be used as design, and are self-documenting. This assumes amendment of traditional customer process requirements.
Requirements Inspection is projected to be reduced by half because the Executable Requirements Modeler tool is a much more efficient way to examine requirements.
Unit test is projected to be reduced to 1 percent cost and 1 day duration, because correct logical function is established during the requirements modeling activity.
Verification Test activities are projected to be reduced by half, based on efficiencies introduced by the automated Test Generator and Coverage Checker. 
V.Conclusion
This predictive analysis has shown that automation or formalization of individual software development process steps is of little or no value, due to the overhead of additional translation steps between dissimilar notations and disciplines.
Significant savings appear only when a collection of related process steps are formalized and automated simultaneously. Depending on the extent of the process modification, savings up to 61 percent of total process cost, and 81 of 168 days of total process duration (compared to the Space Shuttle flight software development process baseline) is predicted. Savings of this magnitude could have significant positive effect on the performance of future programs. 
